89 page opinion

[Galian Beast]

Does anyone have a PDF where it is a document rather than a scanned image?

[peplaw06]

Is this what you're talking about??

http://cowboyszone.com/forums/showpost.php?p=3920625&postcount=112

[Galian Beast]

No that is just an image.

I really don't want to read it, but if its a pure document adobe will read it out to me.

[theogt]

No that is just an image.

I really don't want to read it, but if its a pure document adobe will read it out to me.Unfortunately the court's system has not uploaded a searchable pdf. And that is the only way I could get it into a pdf form.

That said, don't be so damn lazy. ;)

[Galian Beast]

Unfortunately the court's system has not uploaded a searchable pdf. And that is the only way I could get it into a pdf form.

That said, don't be so damn lazy. ;)

Its 89 pages of legal jargon... I'm lazy, but there's no way I would read it, even with how interested I am in it.

[WoodysGirl]

Better copy?

http://a.espncdn.com/photo/2011/0425/judge_nelson.pdf

[theogt]

That should work. It's word searchable.

[Galian Beast]

thanks

[FuzzyLumpkins]

Finally, the court recognized that “a union may end its duty to bargain by disclaiming interest in representing the employees as long as it does so in good faith.” Id. at 1357 n.6. That good faith requirement is met where “a majority of the players clearly have indicated their wish not to be represented by any entity, including the NFLPA, during collective bargaining.”

Here is that good faith argument which basically boils down to: its in good faith if the majority of those to be represented want it that way.

Consent of the governed. AMAZING!!!

Accordingly, it is difficult to accept the NFL’s argument that, in this antitrust action, the question of whether the
Union’s disclaimer is invalid is a “threshold predicate,” rather than a collateral issue, where the Supreme Court has concluded that “the federal courts may decide labor law
questions that emerge as collateral issues in suits brought under independent federal remedies, including the antitrust laws.” Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers and Steamfitters
Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 626 (1975) (emphases added). In short, this antitrust 16 action is not within the Board’s exclusive statutory jurisdiction.

Uh-oh!

If the Supreme Court has in the past decided something that the NFL is claiming is the sole domain of the NLRB then that does not bode well for the NFL's argument.

As the Supreme Court itself later explained, in Garmon, "the term ‘primary jurisdiction’ is used to refer to the various considerations articulated in Garmon . . . that militate in favor of pre-empting state-court jurisdiction over activity which is subject to the unfair labor practice jurisdiction of the federal Board. This use of the term should not be confused with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction [that] has been described by Professor Davis [in his Administrative Law Treatise, now authored by Richard J. Pierce, Jr.]."

Most of these refutations she is giving are directly tied to Supreme Court rulings. Kinda makes it difficult to appeal i would think.

From here she quotes the Supreme Court extensively in their exception to the idea of primary jurisdiction as to the case the NFL cited. She does it over and over again. Its actually kind of funny.

i definitely get the impression from the document that its a lot of we have done this all before with the NFL over and over again. In this case the NFL is clearly trying to twist a ruling whose basis was federalism (re: states rights).

Here, as in Alpharma, this Court finds that “this is not the rare case requiring ‘expert consideration and uniformity of resolution.’” 411 F.3d at 938. This Court is unable to discern much, if any, basis for referring the disclaimer issue to the NLRB. The issue of the Players’ disclaimer of the Union as their collective bargaining agent does not require or otherwise merit the Board’s specialized expertise. The Board has articulated the standard under which disclaimers must be evaluated in a clear and consistent fashion, and application of that established standard requires no particular specialized expertise. Cf. Alpharma, Inc., 411 F.3d at 938 (refusing to refer issue to agency as issue turns on matters “well within the ‘conventional experience of judges’”).

Well that is that.

More on the sham argument:

The NFL predicts that “the Board will undoubtedly recognize that the Union’s purported disclaimer is not motivated by a desire to abandon unionism permanently.” (Doc. No. 34, at 29 (Mem. at 21).) But there is no legal support for any requirement that a disclaimer be permanent. Employees have the right not only to organize as a union but also to refrain from such representation and, as relevant here, to “de-unionize.” 29 U.S.C. § 157.

Moreover, this Court need not resolve the debate about whether their motive was influenced by the expectation of this litigation, because the NLRB’s General Counsel has addressed this question too. “[T]he fact that the disclaimer was motivated by ‘litigation strategy,’ i.e., to deprive the NFL of a defense to players’ antitrust suits and to free the players to engage in individual bargaining for free agency, is irrelevant so long as the disclaimer is otherwise unequivocal and adhered to.”

IOW, it does not matter if they did it so they can sue as long as they do it right. She had just outlined what the correct steps were and been accomplished.

Im about halfway through. These are just the points that i think are important from the judgement especially considering the discussion that have taken place here.

[FuzzyLumpkins]

The League objects, arguing that the Players cannot just flip the “light-switch” and disclaim the Union. But again, employees have the right not to be a union as much as
they have the right to be or organize as a union. Moreover, if negotiating as a union has proven unsuccessful, such organized employees also have the right to terminate the union.

How absolutely refreshing to hear. You cannot force a group of people against their will to remain a union.

Thank you, Judge Nelson.

In exercising its discretion as to whether to apply the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, this Court concludes that resolution of the disclaimer issue is not one of the “rare” instances where the Court would be assisted by referring the issue to the NLRB. The Board already has articulated the governing standard, which is plainly within this Court’s competence to apply here. On the present facts–which disclose no inconsistent 35 conduct following the Union’s disclaimer–this Court sees no basis to dispute the validity
and effectiveness of the Union’s unequivocal disclaimer of any further role as the Players’ agent in collective bargaining with the League.

i read that as 'I am not stupid.' I always thought the NFL's bried was at best condescending.

Section 2 then expressly declares the Act’s policy–to facilitate employees’ ability to organize into unions and bargain collectively with employers:

Whereas . . . the individual unorganized worker is commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract and to protect his freedom of labor, and thereby to obtain acceptable terms and conditions of employment, wherefore, . . . it is necessary that he have full freedom of association, selforganization, and designation of representatives . . . to negotiate the terms
and conditions of his employment, and that he shall be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers . . . in . . . concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining . . . [certain limitations on federal injunctions] are enacted.

Here is the explanation of how the NFL's standard is twisting the N-L Act.

But in Milk Wagon Drivers Union, the Supreme Court ruled that the Act precluded an injunction against a local union and its officials. 311 U.S. at 93-94. In fact, the Supreme Court recounted the history of some federal courts ignoring Section 20 of the Clayton Act, such that its restrictions “have become more or less valueless to labor.” Id. at 102.40 As Justice Frankfurter ruled in addressing a comparable issue under the National Labor Relations Act, which was enacted in 1935 just a few years after the Norris-
LaGuardia Act,

[u]nlike mathematical symbols, the phrasing of such social legislation as this seldom attains more than approximate precision of definition. That is why all relevant aids are summoned to determine meaning. Of compelling
consideration is the fact that words acquire scope and function from the history of events which they summarize.
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 313 U.S. 177, 185-86 (1941)

(emphasis added). In rejecting the proposed interpretation offered by the employer, the Court stated that “[c]ontemporaneous legislative history, and above all, the background of industrial experience forbid such textual mutilation.”

She is citing the Supreme Courts rejection of the NFL's interpretation of Norris-La Guardia. Again not good for the NFL.

But this Court need not rely on its reading of the plain language of Section 104(a) to issue the injunction requested by the Players here, because this Court concludes that the Norris- LaGuardia Act does not apply here at all, now that the Union has effectively renounced its status as the Players negotiating agent.41

The NFL really is screwed in terms of their legal stance.

To propose, as the NFL does, that a labor dispute extends indefinitely beyond the disclaimer of union representation is fraught with peril. For example, in light of the fact that employees come and go over time, it would be patently unfair to impose labor law restrictions or conditions upon employees who began working for the employer only after a union had disclaimed representation of other employees. Similarly, if an employer was in a dispute with its unionized employees over wages or conditions of employment, and the union then disclaimed representation, the dispute would still be governed, under the League’s analysis, by labor law for weeks or months, if not years, after the disclaimer.43

Thank you for championing our right for self determination, Judge Nelson.

This Court is, of course, not the first to have issued injunctive relief against the NFL despite its objections that such relief was precluded by the Norris- LaGuardia Act.

:lmao:

As recognized by the district court in the parties’ earlier litigation in this district, the various restrictions imposed by the League over the several decades of this on-going dispute often inflict irreparable injury on the Players.

I am not going to quote them all but she names case after case that cite irreparable damage including hockey and basketball.

However, just a few weeks prior to the expiration of three of these five players’ contracts, their respective teams sought to change the players’ status. Peyton Manning received a letter from his team, the Indianapolis Colts, in February 2011, purporting to designate him an “Exclusive Franchise Player” under the CBA, which would restrict him from signing a contract with any other NFL team for 2011 season. (Condon Decl. ¶ 4.) Players Jackson and Mankins received imilar letters in February from their respective teams, purporting to designate them as “Franchise Players” under the CBA. (Schwartz Decl. ¶ 11; 55 Bauer Decl. ¶ 6.)

Franchise tags are not going to make it it seems. GOOD!

As the Brady Plaintiffs observe, the NFL does “not contest that their ‘lockout’ is a per se unlawful group boycott and price-fixing agreement in violation of antitrust law.”
(Doc. No. 41, at 6 (Mem. at 1).) Rather, the NFL’s defense is confined to their argument that the non-statutory labor exemption from antitrust liability continues to protect the
League because the NFLPA’s disclaimer was invalid and ineffective and that resolution of that issue is for the NLRB and not this Court. Because this Court has disposed of those
arguments, the NFL presently has identified no defense against Count I of the Brady Plaintiffs’ Complaint. That the policies and decisions of the individual teams constitute
“concerted action” seems plain. Cf. American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2212-17 (2010). Accordingly, the Brady Plaintiffs have
established the requisite fair chance of success on the merits of their claim in Count I that the lockout now constitutes a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.

The lack of even a defense on the issue of fair chance of success was a HUGE oversight by NFL counsel. They seem to be conceding that they are going to lose.

The NFL has identified no legal authority, controlling or otherwise, that stands for the proposition that the non-statutory labor exemption from antitrust liability, extends to protect the labor negotiation tool of a “lockout,” as opposed to a mandatory term of collective bargaining, after a union has disclaimed any further representation of its members.

they really are just conceding the point.

But because the Union’s disclaimer is valid and effective, the labor law policies of collective bargaining must give way to the antitrust policies in favor of competition. On
an economic level, the public has an interest in the enforcement of the Sherman Act, which, by seeking to ensure healthy competition in the market, has a broad impact beyond
the immediate parties to this dispute.

I love that she acknowldeges my position on this. While most people fail to recognize it, the outcome of this has ramifications legally for every American concerning future litigation.

ORDER:
But because the Union’s disclaimer is valid and effective, the labor law policies of collective bargaining must give way to the antitrust policies in favor of competition. On an economic level, the public has an interest in the enforcement of the Sherman Act, which, by seeking to ensure healthy competition in the market, has a broad impact beyond
the immediate parties to this dispute.disputes,” also no longer applies here to preclude injunctive relief. The NFL urges this
Court to expand the law beyond these traditional dictates and argues that the protections of labor law should apply for some indefinite period beyond the collapse and termination
of the collective bargaining relationship. In the absence of either persuasive policy or authority, this Court takes a more conservative approach, and declines to do so.
This Court, having found that the Union’s unequivocal disclaimer is valid and effective, concludes there is no need to defer any issue to the NLRB. Because that disclaimer is valid and effective, the Norris-LaGuardia Act’s prohibition against
injunctive relief does not preclude granting the Player’s motion for a preliminary injunction against what the League characterizes as a “lockout.”

Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Brady Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction [Doc. No. 2] is GRANTED;

2. The Eller Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction [Doc. No. 58] is MOOT; and

3. The “lockout” is enjoined.

And the summation.