Discussion in 'Political Zone' started by Jordan55, Apr 2, 2008.
Maybe we'll get al-Sadr the next time we have a chance.
We will have to wait, he's still hiding in Iran, but calling for a stand down of his militia, might be a true indication of how things where going for them.
Proof positive that we are in fact fighting Iran. The focus is no longer al qaeda elements, as they've been decimated in Iraq, but the Iranian proxy militia's.
Every death is trumpeted as proof of failure, yet everyday facts are ignored.
Urging the Iraqi government to rule by law instead of religious denominations and seeing them act on this ideology is a positive step that many are ignoring in their never ending objective to paint the entire effort as a failure.
al Sadr said himself it's about marrying Islam to government, and the face Maliki is putting on his government is a direct contradiction to that wish. al Sadr talked of losing his influence a month ago, and has resorted to hiding in Iran.
Iran's influence extends only as far as militia's, and they've been beaten to a cease fire, by the ISF.
I think it would scare a lot of people (Iran also) if we sent someone to take him out. If I was a top commander that would be my plan.
I would already have a plan to launch a few cruise missles into Iran after this. If they retaliate just get Israel join in. Time should be running out for these people. You don't kill US soliders and threaten the destruction of Israel and get away with it. We've been letting it happen for years now. No excuse.
Those are your OPINIONS.
Here is another:
Al-Sadr Remains Strong
While the military confrontation ended essentially in a stalemate, al-Sadr came away with a political victory. His militia remains intact and he has demonstrated that it can withstand a major assault by the Iraqi military.
The aftermath of the clashes also showed that al-Sadr still has control over his militia. There had been much speculation that al-Sadr had lost control of the Al-Mahdi Army and that some breakaway factions were not heeding his authority. The Al-Basrah clashes and subsequent cease-fire demonstrated that he was still in charge.
While his militia were clearly not a passive actor in the Al-Basrah violence, their armed struggle was framed in the context of self-defense. The Iraqi security forces were seen as the aggressors in launching the military campaign, which many Sadrists described as politically motivated.
As it became clear during the Al-Basrah operation that the Al-Mahdi Army was the main target, al-Sadr continued to adhere to the truce he declared for the militia. The truce was instituted in August 2007 after his forces clashed with police in the holy city of Al-Najaf. There were concerns recently that the increased pressure on the Al-Mahdi Army might push al-Sadr to end the truce.
Maintaining the truce gave the appearance that al-Sadr was willing to place Iraq's benefits above his own political ambitions, which he stressed in the nine-point statement that led to the current cease-fire. In it, he supported Iraq's unity by calling for an "end to armed appearances in Al-Basrah and all other provinces."
Considering his bravado when his militia took on the U.S. military twice in 2004, al-Sadr's actions during the latest confrontation suggested his growing maturity as a political leader.
Huge Blow To Al-Maliki
For al-Maliki, the results of the "Battle for Al-Basrah" were certainly humiliating, given that he personally oversaw the military campaign. Al-Maliki hoped to erase the perception that he is a weak and ineffectual leader, particularly in dealing with al-Sadr and his militia. However, soon after the operation began, it was apparent that al-Maliki greatly overestimated the abilities of his forces and underestimated the tenacity of al-Sadr's militia.
Al-Maliki had vowed to crush the Shi'ite militias, armed gangs, and criminals that effectively controlled the city for three years. He initially gave all armed elements in Al-Basrah 72 hours to disarm, but after this was ignored, the deadline was extended to 10 days, coupled with an offer of cash in exchange for weapons.
In an operation that was planned to be completed quickly, Iraqi security forces were met with strong resistance from al-Sadr's militia, despite U.S. air support. Defense Minister Abd al-Qadir Jasim admitted on March 28 that the government had been "surprised" by the militia's resistance and the government's battle plan and tactics had to be altered.
More troubling for al-Maliki, "Al-Azzam" reported on March 31 that several thousand police officers had refused to fight the militia and two Iraqi Army regiments reportedly defected to the Sadrists. If numerous acts of insubordination and desertion indeed took place during the operation, this would indicate the low level of morale among the security forces.
In the end, al-Maliki declared the operation a "success." However, his words may ring hollow since he failed to disarm and crush al-Sadr's militia, and this may have weakened him politically in the eyes of his ruling Shi'ite alliance.
The revelation that members of his own Shi'ite alliance, including from his own Al-Da'wah Party, went to Iran against his wishes to broker a truce further undercuts his authority and ultimately his credibility.
If they're so strong then why did they quit?
Did Al-Sadr himself write this article?
And why is he hiding in Iran?
No, they were observations, based on recent facts.
al Sadr did say those things, Iran is obviously involved and al Sadr caved in to the pressure, while hiding in Iran. These arent opinions, they are what is happening.
What I stated was that this is a positive step in the right direction: the Iraqi government, acting on the rule of law, not religion. Being proactive and asserting it's authority.
No one can say for sure what the outcome will be; to declare it a victory for one and a defeat for the other is nothing more than biased posturing. More examples of rushing to failure. I wouldn't rely on Op Ed pieces as definitive answers, especially when they rely on expecting people to fully accept their prognostications and historical rewrites.
Like the ridiculous assertion the author maintains with Considering his bravado when his militia took on the U.S. military twice in 2004.
Does he mean those times when al Sadr's compound was under siege and he waved the white flag, saying he wants be part of the political process, to then run to Iran?
If hiding in another country and ordering your miitia to stand down three times, during armed conflict is a victory, then the conditions of war and the definition of victory certainly have changed. No wonder everyone is so pessimistic.