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I went to check my inbox this morning, and lo and behold, the 2018 QB Catalogue by Cian Fahey was sitting right there. Of course I went straight to Dak's section, and have shared that section below.
It's fairly long, but well worth the read. Besides Dak, it also touches on Dez, Garrett, and more, and both reaffirms and refutes many things that are said on this board.
I hope it's ok to post - Dak's section is only 6 pages of a document that's hundreds of pages long, and I didn't include any of the pictures.
Dak (first part):
It's fairly long, but well worth the read. Besides Dak, it also touches on Dez, Garrett, and more, and both reaffirms and refutes many things that are said on this board.
I hope it's ok to post - Dak's section is only 6 pages of a document that's hundreds of pages long, and I didn't include any of the pictures.
Dak (first part):
Shorthand Skill Set
• Outstanding decision maker who diagnoses alignments before the snap and reacts quickly to adjustments after the snap.
• Accuracy took a big jump in second season.
• Runs one of the more demanding schemes in the NFL and does so consistently.
• Technically-sound, smart and aware pocket passer.
200
After a seven-yard completion to Jason Witten on first down, Dak Prescott hurried his offense back to the line. It was Second-and-3 at the Giants 44-yard line. The ball was on the right hash mark. Witten, Cole Beasley and Dez Bryant were to the quarterback’s left on the wide side of the field. Ezekiel Elliott was wide of Brice Butler on the right side. The Giants showed man coverage across the field with two safeties deep, splitting the field in half.
Prescott told Elliott and Butler to swap so that Butler was outside the numbers and his running back was in the slot. Then he set himself in the pocket and waited for the snap. One hard count later he was walking forward to his center, barking out orders to his linemen, making hand signals to his receivers and gesturing like a patient in an insane asylum. Prescott then settled again behind his center. He waited for the snap. One more hard count revealed the intentions of the deep safeties who made to rotate on his action. Prescott repeated his motions behind the line of scrimmage, this time taking more time to call the full-blown audible.
When the ball was eventually snapped, Prescott’s eyes went to his left seam. The linebacker loitering over the middle of the field moved with them. He recognized it and immediately snapped his head back to the other side of the field. Brice Butler had run a terrible route, but Prescott had created a window through which he could throw him open with perfect timing. The placement of the ball led Butler away from the defender, in behind the linebacker who had been led away from that spot on the field and too far in front of the deep safety who had rotated backwards at the snap. Prescott’s pass hit Butler in the chest. A split second later it hit the ground.
Butler’s drop cost the offense a first down and him an opportunity to run into the redzone. If he could beat the angle of the deep safety, it could have even been a touchdown.
The drop meant this play was soon forgotten in the greater landscape of the season. It wasn’t a highlight play that would live on through the medium of youtube. Instead it was just any old play you could pick out from every other game each week. But it was startling to watch from Prescott. In only his second season he not only has the ability to consistently audible into the right plays, he has the poise and command to audible into one play, then into another on the same play. Few quarterbacks consistently audible into right plays, it’s hard to think of another outside of Peyton Manning who then changes the play a second time when he recognizes that the defense has reacted or given up more information. Prescott’s processing speed and comfort to function within the pocket has come to define his quality over the first two seasons of his career.
It was shown off more during his rookie season because he played with a better supporting cast. That supporting cast lost multiple offensive linemen (Ronald Leary and Doug Free) which forced La’el Collins to move from left guard to right tackle, creating multiple weak spots on a line that previous had none. That was when the unit was fully healthy. When Tyron Smith was hurt, Prescott was being sucked into a black hole on his left side every snap. Instead of altering his play calling to adjust to not having a competent left tackle, Jason Garrett stood oblivious on the sideline as useful as a politician holding a snowball to try and deny climate change. With a dominant offensive line and Ezekiel Elliott available for all 16 games during his rookie season, the Cowboys’ receiving corps had more space and time to get open. When those things were taken away, that same receiving corps had to create their own separation. Something they’re not capable of doing.
Cole Beasley was Prescott’s favorite target during his rookie season. Beasley himself looked slower in 2017 compared to 2016, but offensive coordinator Scott Linehan said that teams were prioritizing him more with their coverages, forcing Prescott to look outside, “One of the adjustments defenses are using to stop the option routerunners from attacking the middle of the field...We call it prevent-man coverage. They are really rushing three guys at times. They are playing an outside hole player and an inside hole player...to stop some of the big chain movers like Cole...It kind of started midway through last year. And everybody is doing it now.”
Beasley isn’t the first name you think of from the Cowboys skill position players. Dez Bryant and Jason Witten are more reputable players. They’re also worse players at this point. Bad players even.
Bryant tied Jarvis Landry for the most failed receptions on intermediate throws last year, they both had five. But unlike Landry, Bryant also led the league on failed receptions on underneath throws with six. He had 14 total failed receptions with five created receptions to offset it. He had the sixth-worst failed reception rate, ahead of only three rookies, Ricardo Louis and J.J. Nelson. He ranked 99th out of 110 receivers in efficiency, catching 88.3 percent of his catchable targets. Dropping the ball a lot wouldn’t be a big issue for Bryant if he was getting open more often. He was a great athlete during previous years of his career, but he was never a great route runner. When his legs went from underneath him in 2017, he wasn’t able to compensate with precise footwork or by using his upper body aggressively.
Bryant submits to aggressive coverage and relies on Prescott to throw him open because his catch radius has shrunk with his explosiveness. A receiver incapable of creating separation or winning at the catch point doesn’t have any value. His limitations will be emphasized when asked to run isolated routes.
The kind that Jason Garrett exclusively relies on.
Eagles defensive coordinator Jim Schwartz is a fan of zero blitzes. He tried two against the Seahawks when Russell Wilson and Doug Baldwin took advantage of the matchups those plays give you. On this play against the Cowboys, Schwartz tries to hide his zero blitz with a safety rotation at the snap.
Patrick Robinson isn’t one of the best cornerbacks in the league. He wasn’t the most-talented cornerback on the Eagles. But he had no fear of Bryant in single coverage. He sat off the line initially, Bryant was slow through his stem, before getting on top of Bryant and shielding him away from the ball.
Prescott recognized the safety rotation and brought his eyes away from his covered receiver on the left side to get the ball out for Bryant on time. There was just nowhere for the quarterback to put the ball. There was no window to hit.
A true number one receiver takes advantage of the mismatch in space to either get in behind the defender or force his way into a position where he can win at the catch point. Prescott put the ball in the right spot, his receiver just couldn’t get to that spot.
That doesn’t go down as a failed reception for Bryant. It goes down as an inaccurate throw for Prescott. That’s the negative of playing with receivers who don’t separate. When it’s not 100 percent inarguably the receiver’s fault, the blame falls on the quarterback. Since Garrett doesn’t scheme his receivers open, Prescott was throwing to a group of receivers who couldn’t separate on routes that they couldn’t win. None of Bryant, Brice Butler, Beasley, Terrance Williams and Witten gave their quarterback even an average margin for error.
Even while playing in a difficult scheme with receivers who couldn’t get open, Prescott was still phenomenally accurate. He was the fourth-most accurate passer in football last year, one of only four quarterbacks with a depth-adjusted accuracy rate above 60 percent.
Prescott threw a higher rate of his passes into the 1-10 yard range than any other quarterback and ranked sixth in the league in accuracy to that range with an 81.3 accuracy percentage. He was also a top-10 deep passer, hitting 42.5 percent of his throws that traveled further than 20 yards downfield. His two weak spots, short and intermediate throws, were both within 1.6 percent of the league average.
Although his receivers had the ninth-worst failed reception rate, it was that lack of fear rather than the failures that matters more for Prescott moving forward.
When you’re a cornerback who doesn’t fear a receiver’s vertical element you can sit on his route and read him through your coverage. On this play against Washington, Bryant is disrespected by the safety who is sitting on the in-breaking route as part of quarters coverage. Bryant needs to understand the safety is sitting on his route and aggressively push upfield before timing a hard cut beneath him. It needs to be a defined action.
As soon as Bryant clears the underneath linebacker, he stops his feet. Not only does he not push upfield to force the safety to turn before he breaks inside, he slows down to tap his feet in one spot multiple times. Bryant is trying to make it harder for the defender to read his intentions but actually just allows him to continue to sit off of him, shaded to the inside, waiting for him to break infield.
When Bryant does begin his break inside, he does so at a bend rather than with a sharp plant. His sluggish movement lets the defender break on the ball in front of him. Prescott should have come off this read and located his deep route on the opposite side of the field. But too often there wasn’t another open option to throw to.
Jason Witten will be a first-ballot hall of famer. He is going to go down as one of the greatest tight ends ever because of his longevity and production. There was a time when he was hugely valuable to the Cowboys and he’s still a very good blocker, but he handicaps the passing game. He doesn’t have any athleticism anymore.
Witten was the worst player in football after the catch, averaging 1.6 yards after the catch. But more importantly, he could be shut down with aggressive-man coverage.
From that same Washington game, the Cowboys isolate Witten on the narrow (right) side of the field. The point here is to force the defense to reveal declare its coverage by alignment. Three receivers on the wide side of the field draw the deep-lying safety to that side. It’s either a one-on-one for Witten or space for those receivers. Because the ball was on the right hash and there was only one safety deep, that defender began the play shaded to the wide side of the field.
When Prescott’s back foot hits the top of his drop, his eyes are looking towards Beasley and Bryant working in the left seam. All four receivers release vertically initially, although Beasley will eventually break his route towards the sideline. Washington are playing Cover-1, so each of those receivers are being aggressively covered by single defenders. There is one linebacker lingering over the middle of the field, spying Prescott in the pocket. On the backside of the play, Witten is also releasing vertically with the other safety trailing him underneath.The deep safety’s eyes are on Prescott though, so he is moving in the opposite direction. Leaving Witten one-on-one.
As was very often the case, Prescott was technically perfect and showed off perfect timing on this play. He recognized that none of his front-side receivers were open and recognized the deep safety following his eyes, making it harder for them to get open.
He resets his feet to square his shoulders to Witten as the tight end begins to turn into a deep curl route. The problem is that Witten is not open. Nor does he have any chance of being thrown open.
The safety covering Witten knows that he’s a better athlete than him. So he just sits underneath the tight end and waits for him to run his curl route. He anticipates the route, but also isn’t scared of being wrong because he’ll just recover with his speed. There is a vast amount of space in behind the safety, but Witten can’t run away from him so the defender doesn’t care.
Witten’s inability to win makes the offense more predictable and shuts off space for everyone else.
The offense used an alignment in the hopes of dictating where the ball would go, but ultimately it’s the defense that is forcing the offense to play to its weaknesses. They dictate where the ball goes. Prescott is forced to extend the play and attempt to create outside of structure. Remember, the defense had a spy waiting for this.
Prescott should be sacked but he manages to evade the interior penetration by strafing sideways before abandoning his throwing posture to climb rapidly through the pocket. Once he escapes the first defender, his eyes immediately go back up to his receivers on the left side of the field.
Beasley didn’t get open within the timing of the play, his route was redirected off the line of scrimmage so it took him a long time to work around the defender before breaking outside. Prescott is tripped up before he can escape the pocket cleanly, with the spying linebacker forcing him to try and escape sideways rather than up the middle.
Prescott’s strength to still throw the ball, beginning his throwing motion after he began falling to the ground was very impressive but it was his overall processing in the pocket that allowed him to reach that point of the play.
Beasley had one defender to beat for a first down but couldn’t make him miss in space. He gained six yards on Third-and-7, leading to a punt.
