2018 QB Catalogue (Dak)

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I went to check my inbox this morning, and lo and behold, the 2018 QB Catalogue by Cian Fahey was sitting right there. Of course I went straight to Dak's section, and have shared that section below.

It's fairly long, but well worth the read. Besides Dak, it also touches on Dez, Garrett, and more, and both reaffirms and refutes many things that are said on this board.

I hope it's ok to post - Dak's section is only 6 pages of a document that's hundreds of pages long, and I didn't include any of the pictures.

Dak (first part):

Shorthand Skill Set
• Outstanding decision maker who diagnoses alignments before the snap and reacts quickly to adjustments after the snap.
• Accuracy took a big jump in second season.
• Runs one of the more demanding schemes in the NFL and does so consistently.
• Technically-sound, smart and aware pocket passer.
200

After a seven-yard completion to Jason Witten on first down, Dak Prescott hurried his offense back to the line. It was Second-and-3 at the Giants 44-yard line. The ball was on the right hash mark. Witten, Cole Beasley and Dez Bryant were to the quarterback’s left on the wide side of the field. Ezekiel Elliott was wide of Brice Butler on the right side. The Giants showed man coverage across the field with two safeties deep, splitting the field in half.

Prescott told Elliott and Butler to swap so that Butler was outside the numbers and his running back was in the slot. Then he set himself in the pocket and waited for the snap. One hard count later he was walking forward to his center, barking out orders to his linemen, making hand signals to his receivers and gesturing like a patient in an insane asylum. Prescott then settled again behind his center. He waited for the snap. One more hard count revealed the intentions of the deep safeties who made to rotate on his action. Prescott repeated his motions behind the line of scrimmage, this time taking more time to call the full-blown audible.

When the ball was eventually snapped, Prescott’s eyes went to his left seam. The linebacker loitering over the middle of the field moved with them. He recognized it and immediately snapped his head back to the other side of the field. Brice Butler had run a terrible route, but Prescott had created a window through which he could throw him open with perfect timing. The placement of the ball led Butler away from the defender, in behind the linebacker who had been led away from that spot on the field and too far in front of the deep safety who had rotated backwards at the snap. Prescott’s pass hit Butler in the chest. A split second later it hit the ground.

Butler’s drop cost the offense a first down and him an opportunity to run into the redzone. If he could beat the angle of the deep safety, it could have even been a touchdown.

The drop meant this play was soon forgotten in the greater landscape of the season. It wasn’t a highlight play that would live on through the medium of youtube. Instead it was just any old play you could pick out from every other game each week. But it was startling to watch from Prescott. In only his second season he not only has the ability to consistently audible into the right plays, he has the poise and command to audible into one play, then into another on the same play. Few quarterbacks consistently audible into right plays, it’s hard to think of another outside of Peyton Manning who then changes the play a second time when he recognizes that the defense has reacted or given up more information. Prescott’s processing speed and comfort to function within the pocket has come to define his quality over the first two seasons of his career.

It was shown off more during his rookie season because he played with a better supporting cast. That supporting cast lost multiple offensive linemen (Ronald Leary and Doug Free) which forced La’el Collins to move from left guard to right tackle, creating multiple weak spots on a line that previous had none. That was when the unit was fully healthy. When Tyron Smith was hurt, Prescott was being sucked into a black hole on his left side every snap. Instead of altering his play calling to adjust to not having a competent left tackle, Jason Garrett stood oblivious on the sideline as useful as a politician holding a snowball to try and deny climate change. With a dominant offensive line and Ezekiel Elliott available for all 16 games during his rookie season, the Cowboys’ receiving corps had more space and time to get open. When those things were taken away, that same receiving corps had to create their own separation. Something they’re not capable of doing.

Cole Beasley was Prescott’s favorite target during his rookie season. Beasley himself looked slower in 2017 compared to 2016, but offensive coordinator Scott Linehan said that teams were prioritizing him more with their coverages, forcing Prescott to look outside, “One of the adjustments defenses are using to stop the option routerunners from attacking the middle of the field...We call it prevent-man coverage. They are really rushing three guys at times. They are playing an outside hole player and an inside hole player...to stop some of the big chain movers like Cole...It kind of started midway through last year. And everybody is doing it now.”

Beasley isn’t the first name you think of from the Cowboys skill position players. Dez Bryant and Jason Witten are more reputable players. They’re also worse players at this point. Bad players even.
Bryant tied Jarvis Landry for the most failed receptions on intermediate throws last year, they both had five. But unlike Landry, Bryant also led the league on failed receptions on underneath throws with six. He had 14 total failed receptions with five created receptions to offset it. He had the sixth-worst failed reception rate, ahead of only three rookies, Ricardo Louis and J.J. Nelson. He ranked 99th out of 110 receivers in efficiency, catching 88.3 percent of his catchable targets. Dropping the ball a lot wouldn’t be a big issue for Bryant if he was getting open more often. He was a great athlete during previous years of his career, but he was never a great route runner. When his legs went from underneath him in 2017, he wasn’t able to compensate with precise footwork or by using his upper body aggressively.

Bryant submits to aggressive coverage and relies on Prescott to throw him open because his catch radius has shrunk with his explosiveness. A receiver incapable of creating separation or winning at the catch point doesn’t have any value. His limitations will be emphasized when asked to run isolated routes.
The kind that Jason Garrett exclusively relies on.

Eagles defensive coordinator Jim Schwartz is a fan of zero blitzes. He tried two against the Seahawks when Russell Wilson and Doug Baldwin took advantage of the matchups those plays give you. On this play against the Cowboys, Schwartz tries to hide his zero blitz with a safety rotation at the snap.
Patrick Robinson isn’t one of the best cornerbacks in the league. He wasn’t the most-talented cornerback on the Eagles. But he had no fear of Bryant in single coverage. He sat off the line initially, Bryant was slow through his stem, before getting on top of Bryant and shielding him away from the ball.
Prescott recognized the safety rotation and brought his eyes away from his covered receiver on the left side to get the ball out for Bryant on time. There was just nowhere for the quarterback to put the ball. There was no window to hit.

A true number one receiver takes advantage of the mismatch in space to either get in behind the defender or force his way into a position where he can win at the catch point. Prescott put the ball in the right spot, his receiver just couldn’t get to that spot.

That doesn’t go down as a failed reception for Bryant. It goes down as an inaccurate throw for Prescott. That’s the negative of playing with receivers who don’t separate. When it’s not 100 percent inarguably the receiver’s fault, the blame falls on the quarterback. Since Garrett doesn’t scheme his receivers open, Prescott was throwing to a group of receivers who couldn’t separate on routes that they couldn’t win. None of Bryant, Brice Butler, Beasley, Terrance Williams and Witten gave their quarterback even an average margin for error.

Even while playing in a difficult scheme with receivers who couldn’t get open, Prescott was still phenomenally accurate. He was the fourth-most accurate passer in football last year, one of only four quarterbacks with a depth-adjusted accuracy rate above 60 percent.

Prescott threw a higher rate of his passes into the 1-10 yard range than any other quarterback and ranked sixth in the league in accuracy to that range with an 81.3 accuracy percentage. He was also a top-10 deep passer, hitting 42.5 percent of his throws that traveled further than 20 yards downfield. His two weak spots, short and intermediate throws, were both within 1.6 percent of the league average.
Although his receivers had the ninth-worst failed reception rate, it was that lack of fear rather than the failures that matters more for Prescott moving forward.

When you’re a cornerback who doesn’t fear a receiver’s vertical element you can sit on his route and read him through your coverage. On this play against Washington, Bryant is disrespected by the safety who is sitting on the in-breaking route as part of quarters coverage. Bryant needs to understand the safety is sitting on his route and aggressively push upfield before timing a hard cut beneath him. It needs to be a defined action.

As soon as Bryant clears the underneath linebacker, he stops his feet. Not only does he not push upfield to force the safety to turn before he breaks inside, he slows down to tap his feet in one spot multiple times. Bryant is trying to make it harder for the defender to read his intentions but actually just allows him to continue to sit off of him, shaded to the inside, waiting for him to break infield.

When Bryant does begin his break inside, he does so at a bend rather than with a sharp plant. His sluggish movement lets the defender break on the ball in front of him. Prescott should have come off this read and located his deep route on the opposite side of the field. But too often there wasn’t another open option to throw to.

Jason Witten will be a first-ballot hall of famer. He is going to go down as one of the greatest tight ends ever because of his longevity and production. There was a time when he was hugely valuable to the Cowboys and he’s still a very good blocker, but he handicaps the passing game. He doesn’t have any athleticism anymore.

Witten was the worst player in football after the catch, averaging 1.6 yards after the catch. But more importantly, he could be shut down with aggressive-man coverage.

From that same Washington game, the Cowboys isolate Witten on the narrow (right) side of the field. The point here is to force the defense to reveal declare its coverage by alignment. Three receivers on the wide side of the field draw the deep-lying safety to that side. It’s either a one-on-one for Witten or space for those receivers. Because the ball was on the right hash and there was only one safety deep, that defender began the play shaded to the wide side of the field.

When Prescott’s back foot hits the top of his drop, his eyes are looking towards Beasley and Bryant working in the left seam. All four receivers release vertically initially, although Beasley will eventually break his route towards the sideline. Washington are playing Cover-1, so each of those receivers are being aggressively covered by single defenders. There is one linebacker lingering over the middle of the field, spying Prescott in the pocket. On the backside of the play, Witten is also releasing vertically with the other safety trailing him underneath.The deep safety’s eyes are on Prescott though, so he is moving in the opposite direction. Leaving Witten one-on-one.

As was very often the case, Prescott was technically perfect and showed off perfect timing on this play. He recognized that none of his front-side receivers were open and recognized the deep safety following his eyes, making it harder for them to get open.

He resets his feet to square his shoulders to Witten as the tight end begins to turn into a deep curl route. The problem is that Witten is not open. Nor does he have any chance of being thrown open.
The safety covering Witten knows that he’s a better athlete than him. So he just sits underneath the tight end and waits for him to run his curl route. He anticipates the route, but also isn’t scared of being wrong because he’ll just recover with his speed. There is a vast amount of space in behind the safety, but Witten can’t run away from him so the defender doesn’t care.

Witten’s inability to win makes the offense more predictable and shuts off space for everyone else.
The offense used an alignment in the hopes of dictating where the ball would go, but ultimately it’s the defense that is forcing the offense to play to its weaknesses. They dictate where the ball goes. Prescott is forced to extend the play and attempt to create outside of structure. Remember, the defense had a spy waiting for this.

Prescott should be sacked but he manages to evade the interior penetration by strafing sideways before abandoning his throwing posture to climb rapidly through the pocket. Once he escapes the first defender, his eyes immediately go back up to his receivers on the left side of the field.

Beasley didn’t get open within the timing of the play, his route was redirected off the line of scrimmage so it took him a long time to work around the defender before breaking outside. Prescott is tripped up before he can escape the pocket cleanly, with the spying linebacker forcing him to try and escape sideways rather than up the middle.

Prescott’s strength to still throw the ball, beginning his throwing motion after he began falling to the ground was very impressive but it was his overall processing in the pocket that allowed him to reach that point of the play.

Beasley had one defender to beat for a first down but couldn’t make him miss in space. He gained six yards on Third-and-7, leading to a punt.
 
Dak (second part):

The Cowboys weren’t a big-play passing game last year. With Bryant and Witten incapable of creating separation and Beasley being exclusively a possession receiver, Terrance Williams and Brice Butler were Prescott’s deep threat options. Williams played a lot more than Butler, but his limited ball skills and route running ability have always made him an underwhelming talent.

Save for one game against a depleted Giants defense where the coaching staff repeatedly called aggressive coverages so Bryant, Beasley and Rod Smith were all able to break off huge gains after the catch, most of the Cowboys’ big passing plays were instigated by Prescott’s brilliance.

He consistently created big play opportunities outside of structure when forced from the pocket, but more importantly he became one of the league’s better passers into tight windows. That was his biggest issue as a rookie. Prescott too often turned down tight window throws because he had the time to find open options.

(Numerous pictures here of Dak fitting throws into tight windows to receivers.)

In Jason Garrett’s bland offense, the quarterback has to be able to throw into tight windows downfield. The level of difficulty executing his offense is extremely high, especially so when you have limited receivers. Without a great running game, the receivers simply don’t get any help to get open.
Andy Reid added Sammy Watkins to his offense this offseason. That gives him Watkins, Tyreek Hill, Travis Kelce and Kareem Hunt as the foundation of Patrick Mahomes offense. There is explosiveness everywhere on that field. Reid will set maximize the impact of that explosiveness by concentrating his offense on short and deep throws. The offense will be full of options so the quarterback is always set up to throw into space rather than into tighter windows.

Last year, when Alex Smith was Reid’s quarterback and he didn’t even have Watkins yet, the quarterback threw 37.8 percent of his passes either behind the line of scrimmage or further than 20 yards downfield. That was eight percent higher than the average amongst quarterbacks with at least 200 attempts. Prescott was at the opposite end of that measurement. Only 22.8 percent of his throws went short or deep. More than three quarters of Prescott’s attempts went into the thick of the coverage. Only Trevor Siemian threw a higher percentage of his passes into the 1-20 yard range.

That was the same style of offense that Prescott ran during his rookie season. 61.7 percent of his passes traveled further than five yards downfield that year and he had the eight-highest rate of intermediate throws. That was a massive challenge, especially for a rookie, but he also had significantly better pass protection and Elliott’s presence in the backfield was a greater threat.

Losing Elliott was a huge problem for the Cowboys but not because Prescott depends on him, but because Garrett and the receivers do.

When Elliott was in the backfield, the threat of him as a runner and the threat of him coming out of the backfield as a receiver created more hesitation in defenders dropping into coverage. That distorted the timing of the coverage and took the focus of individual defenders away from their assignments. Even outside of his suspension when he wasn’t on the field at all, the Cowboys needed a better version of Elliott than they got last year. He entered the season without the same level of explosiveness that he had previously.

It’s an unfair stress on both quarterback and running back that they have to play at such a high level just for the offense to function, but that’s what the Cowboys locked themselves into when they decided to retain Garrett this offseason.

That Atlanta game should have been the final straw. When Tyron Smith was injured, Garrett treated his offense as if Smith didn’t matter. As if he was easily replaced. As if his role on the team was the same as his backup’s should be. Prescott never had a chance as Adrian Clayborn hit him with the suddenness of two magnets coming together.

Garrett is too conservative for this league. 10 years ago, 20 years ago, this was the offense to run. Now that passing games are more dynamic and creative than they’ve ever been, the Cowboys isolation routes and straight dropbacks are putting too much pressure on the team’s skill position players. Including Prescott.

By running an offense where players aren’t put in space and defenses are allowed to be proactive in their decision making, you’re scheming inconsistency into your players by asking them to do tougher things more often than their peers. Prescott led the league with eight non-quarterback interceptions last year. He had the highest rate at 1.6 percent and was the only quarterback with more than six, three other quarterbacks had at least five.

Four of those eight hit receivers and bounced to defenders. Two more came when the quarterback was untimely hit as he released the ball, one was a miscommunication with Terrance Williams and one more was tipped at the line of scrimmage.

It was inevitable that Prescott would throw more interceptions during his second season. His rookie year was too far of an anomaly for it to continue. But he was still excellent at taking care of the ball. He ranked sixth in interceptable pass rate, throwing one every 28.8 attempts. 3.5 percent of his passes were interceptable which is a significant drop from the 2.6 percent during his rookie season. That’s about the drop you’d expect considering the changes around him. He had to chase games more often which led to taking more risks.

Prescott is the least of the Cowboys worries. They haven’t done anything to get better around him in the offseason, they’ll be relying on rookies from the draft to improve their offense on paper. Maybe Bryant can turn his career around and return to being one of the more intimidating receivers in the league, but that’s unlikely. He’s only 29 but it’s not like he just has a consistency issue to correct. That sluggishness is unlikely to disappear on its own.

A healthy and available Elliott will help a lot. A healthy and available Tyron Smith will too. Prescott, Elliott and Smith are the foundation of this team moving forward. With Demarcus Lawrence on the defensive side of the ball.

What they need is a greater impact from younger players such as Ryan Switzer and Rico Geathers. Neither of those guys are expected to be stars and chances are they won’t be given chances by the conservative Garrett so that’s more likely a pipe dream than rational expectation.

Year two didn’t go as planned for Prescott but anyone overreacting to his second season likely overreacted to his first too. He’s actually growing and making strides towards being one of the best quarterbacks in the league. Midway through last season he was one of the best quarterbacks in the league, but struggled too much over the second half.

The reason to be optimistic about Prescott is that the foundation of his skill set is built on great technical ability, his acumen and his consistent ball placement. When you go through all of the quarterbacks who have sustained success for more than a decade in this league, they all share those traits as the foundation of their success.

And sure, his supporting cast will have a huge impact on his output, but that’s the same for every quarterback. It just gets brought up with Prescott more often for whatever reason.
 
And some of Carsus' (the ellipses are mine, showing the places where I snipped parts out):

Shorthand Skill Set

• Excellent at diagnosing defenses before the snap.

• Athletic enough to create plays with his feet and throw downfield on the run.

• Hugely inconsistent accuracy on short and deep throws.

• One of the better intermediate passers in the league, shows off impressive touch and timing.

• Quick to react and deliver the ball against heavy blitzes.


...Taking care of the ball was Wentz’s best trait. It was his most consistent trait. He executed Doug Pederson’s offense expertly. That’s where the big change was. This wasn’t as simple as swapping in Alshon Jeffery and Torrey Smith for Jordan Matthews and Josh Huff, there was real growth for the then 24-year old.


But growth is one thing. Becoming a superstar is another.


Wentz’s big step forward saw him make the move from the basement of the league into the middle tier of starters. A lopsided touchdown-to-interception ratio suggested that Wentz had become a star but his year was more like Matt Ryan’s in 2016, Derek Carr’s in 2016, Andy Dalton’s in 2015, Ryan Fitzpatrick’s in 2015, Nick Foles’ in 2013 and Matthew Stafford’s in 2011. Even Alex Smith’s 2017 season. Like the majority of those quarterbacks, Wentz had a good season but he was the quarterback of a great offense rather than a great quarterback. A recurring theme from those seasons was the combination of a great offensive line and outstanding scheme.


One notable absentee from that list of quarterbacks is Dak Prescott. Prescott and Wentz have been compared to one another since the beginning of last season. Prescott received a lot of skepticism through his success during his rookie season because of where he was drafted and the quality of the Cowboys offensive line. Wentz was a top pick so the natural skepticism doesn’t arise with him. Yet, Wentz’s situation in 2017 was significantly better than Prescott’s was in 2016. Prescott had a great offensive line and a great running game. He didn’t have ball-winning receivers and his scheme was anything but friendly. Prescott mostly had to throw to isolated routes and the success of the offense lived and died on intermediate throws that required timing and anticipation through tight windows. He had a great offensive line but nothing else was particularly great about his offense. Wentz had a great offensive line and a great scheme with more explosive skill position players...


...A quarterback who performs under those conditions should have a higher accuracy percentage. He should be hitting receivers with greater consistency regardless of how deep he is throwing the ball. Wentz’s accuracy numbers were very similar to Derek Carr’s in 2016. Carr’s offensive line was phenomenal also and his receivers were able to consistently create separation downfield. Carr was hugely inconsistent in finding them, so when the conditions he played under got worse in 2017, his inconsistencies became a bigger problem.


That’s the fear for Eagles fans with Wentz. The big difference between the two is Pederson is a phenomenal coach. Having a great coach in today’s NFL can be more valuable than having a great quarterback. That was showcased by the Eagles winning the Super Bowl with Foles.


So long as Pederson continues to dissect his opponent’s coverages and set his starter up for success behind a great offensive line, then whoever is under center for the Eagles should sustain success moving forward.


But there is one major concern for Wentz surpassed his own inconsistency.


His season ended on a torn ACL. Although ACL repair can become irrelevant for some players, it can also have devastating effects on others. Robert Griffin III is the obvious example that everyone points to but Sam Bradford and Joe Flacco are also recent examples of quarterbacks how have seriously struggled coming off a knee issue. Bradford overcame his but Flacco’s footwork suffered worse than it had prior to that point...


...If Wentz comes back and struggles with his comfort throwing the ball on the move or keeping the ball on option runs, Pederson is going to have to change his offense. Pederson comes from an offense that prioritizes athletic quarterbacks. The Chiefs had Alex Smith and the Eagles acquired Wentz at a great cost because of it. Can the offense function with a Nick Foles type of quarterback? Sure. But Foles was more consistent snap-to-snap as a passer than Wentz was. He was 16 percent more accurate on short throws and four percent more accurate on underneath throws.


Although it was a small sample, Foles was the third-best passer in the league on throws that didn’t travel further than five yards downfield. That’s not a major thing but it helps to keep the offense efficient. It’s a bigger deal when you’re comparing the third-best passer, Foles, to the second worst, Wentz.


Wentz has to compensate for that inefficiency with his athleticism and play outside of structure. And it’s unlikely he becomes a better deep passer after ACL surgery to compensate for it. Calling plays for Foles with his level of athleticism would be easier than calling plays for Wentz if he lost his athleticism because of that consistency as a passer. Even if Foles is the more limited player overall.


The Eagles offense is unlikely to ever again function at the level it did in 2017. That’s less about anything specific to the Eagles and more about sports being played by humans who are inconsistent and bound by the randomness of competition. Look at the Falcons last year, they never had a chance of repeating what they had done in 2016.


Unlike the Falcons, who lost Kyle Shanahan, the Eagles will remain the architect behind their offense. They have lost both their offensive coordinator and quarterbacks coach though, so there will be some disruption for Wentz to overcome in his return.
 
Draft Mark Andrews and have Witten coach him after he retires. Mark could end up a first ballot HOF in Witten's role in this offense.
 
Dak's accuracy percentage without accounting for depth of target was 74.76%, 7th in the league.

His depth-adjusted accuracy (which assigns a value to each throw based on how far downfield it was thrown) was 60.2%, 4th in the league.
 
Read his scouting report and watch him play his scouting report is accurate Dak is not

He has stretches where he is inaccurate and makes some ugly throws sometimes, but it seems he is not inaccurate relative to other quarterbacks. Perhaps the misses stick out more in people's memories.
 
I’ve been saying this for quite some time when people claim Dez’s drops aren’t an issue. It’s not just the drops, he isn’t winning the physical battles he used to which made him the great receiver he was despite not being a good route runner. Even his diehard fans have called those passes “uncatchable” now while trying to shift blame to Dak. Yeah, they are now uncatchable which means Dez really isn’t special anymore. I am glad the article touched on that point. It’s the first I have read about that when talking about Dez
 
I’ve been saying this for quite some time when people claim Dez’s drops aren’t an issue. It’s not just the drops, he isn’t winning the physical battles he used to which made him the great receiver he was despite not being a good route runner. Even his diehard fans have called those passes “uncatchable” now while trying to shift blame to Dak. Yeah, they are now uncatchable which means Dez really isn’t special anymore. I am glad the article touched on that point. It’s the first I have read about that when talking about Dez
The article claim none of the receivers were getting open. None of them? What is going to be the argument when Dez is gone and Dak still have these lapses of inaccuracy?
 
I highly doubt Dak will be the starter by seasons end.
ill insist that his talent level is not NFL ready!
May i be wrong......
You know when you watch these young QBs around the league they all make mistakes but along the way they makes some throws that really WOW you! Dak doesnt make those throws. He has thrown some nice short passes but I havent seen a good 20 yard pass on a rope into tight coverage. I havent seen a ball in the air before the WR turns to catch it. The only thing that Dak has showed is that his first season he was remarkably calm. He made a lot of short good throws.
I dont think I have ever seen a QB lose his mechanics and end up throwing the ball 5 yards short of the WR like Dak did. Maybe its just me but Dak has to have the weakest arm of all the QBs in the league. Yes Dak can throw the ball 50 yards but he needs extra steps to do it.
As far as DEz goes his time in Dallas is over. He needs real coaching and someone to teach him how to run routes.
 
The article claim none of the receivers were getting open. None of them? What is going to be the argument when Dez is gone and Dak still have these lapses of inaccuracy?
Dak has some accuracy issues so I won’t make excuses for that. I also won’t make excuses for Dez not winning as many physical battles either. Both things can be true at the same time.
 
The article claim none of the receivers were getting open. None of them? What is going to be the argument when Dez is gone and Dak still have these lapses of inaccuracy?

It's not saying 100% of the receivers weren't getting open 100% of the time. One of the main points appears to be that Dallas runs an offense predicated on receivers being able to get open, but employs receivers that are not good at getting open compared to their peers.
 
Just look at the final game in Philly where Dez beats his man off the line and Dak throws it into the crowd.

Or the screen vs Seattle that was returned for 6.

These are basic wide open throws Dak doesn’t hit.

The reason he’s credited as having best completion percentage in tight windows is he doesn’t throw receivers open. By the time he’s thrown it the DB has caught back up to the receiver which makes it tight.

I think he reads coverages pretty well for a young QB. He just doesn’t have the Favre-like trait at all of sticking throws in there. Not many QBs should take as many chances as Romo/Favre but Dak is too far the other way IMO
 
You guys bashing Dak...did you even read the article?

We have a #1 wr no one is scared of and a TE who catches the ball and falls down while not being able to get very far down field to begin with. We had an eroding offensive line and our one guy who could get open was being taken away.

Please...in all of your infinite wiadom, explain to me how a 2nd year qb is going to thrive in that environment?
 

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