theogt
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Does anyone have a pdf of this? I can get it off the court's website, but not in pdf from. Here's the summary of the players' arguments against Norris-Laguardia for the legal junkies:
First, the NFL elides the widely accepted meaning in the NLGA of “labor dispute,” which confines that term to cases involving collectively organized employees. Section 13(c), which the Court cited in the stay order, does not expand the definition of “labor dispute” beyond that settled meaning, but rather confirms that the NLGA applies to secondary boycotts—precisely the reason the NLGA was enacted. Similarly, the phrase “grows out of a labor dispute” does not mean that the NLGA applies when a labor dispute no longer exists. Instead, it describes the reach of the NLGA when there is a “labor dispute,” extending the statute’s coverage to cases involving parties other than the immediate participants in the dispute.
Second, if there were any ambiguity about the scope of Section 13, it would be resolved by Section 2. Section 2 prescribes how courts are to “interpre[t]” the NLGA, 29 U.S.C. § 102, and emphasizes that the statute was designed to “protect working men in the exercise of organized, economic power, which is vital to collective bargaining,” Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Chi. River & Ind. R.R. Co., 353 U.S. 30, 40 (1957). Courts must take Section 2 “into consideration in interpreting the [NLGA]’s language and in determining the jurisdiction and authority of federal courts.” Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Chi. & Nw. Ry. Co., 362 U.S. 330, 335–36 (1960). Yet the NFL fails to consider the import and significance of this congressionally enacted mandate. Interpreting the NLGA as stretching beyond the context of organized labor would amount to a sweeping expansion of the statute that cannot be reconciled with Section 2’s interpretive command.
Third, the NFL’s analysis of Section 4(a) is novel, unprecedented, and contrary to both the text and purpose of that provision. In the 80 years since the NLGA was enacted, Appellees are aware of no appellate decision ever holding that lockouts fall within the “no injunction zone” of Section 4. To the contrary, the First, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have concluded that Section 4(a) does not apply to employer conduct at all. Adherence to the stay order’s preliminary analysis is incorrect as a matter of statutory construction and would bring this Court into direct conflict with the decisions of those circuits.
Fourth, the NFL ignores the controlling decision in Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976). Mackey is the only decision of this Court that squarely resolved an NLGA challenge in professional football, and it did so against the position advanced by the NFL in this case. In Mackey, this Court rejected the NFL’s argument that the NLGA barred an injunction against restraints in the player market. This Court expressed considerable doubt about whether the case involved a “labor dispute” at all, but then held that the district court made the findings necessary to satisfy Section 7. See id. at 623. Because the findings in Mackey are materially indistinguishable from the district court’s findings here, see Op. 71–81, Mackey forecloses the NFL’s cursory argument that the court violated Section 7. Remarkably, and revealingly, the NFL’s brief does not discuss—or even cite—Mackey.
Fifth, the stay order suggested that the district court might have erred in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing under Section 7. But this Court has joined numerous other courts of appeals in concluding that an evidentiary hearing is unnecessary where the facts are undisputed, as is the case here. See Kan. City S. Transp. Co. v. Teamsters, 126 F.3d 1059, 1067–68 (8th Cir. 1997). Indeed, the NFL never even made such a request except in passing references in response to questions at oral argument. See, e.g., App. 521:4–7.
