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Living in the Cap Era
By Tim Wilson
For better or worse, the salary cap is here to stay in the NFL, and we are now firmly entrenched in what could probably be called the 2nd generation of the Salary Cap Era (or, “How I Learned to Love the Cap”
. Teams have figured out how to work within the constraints of the salary cap, and while there are still some occasional cases of poor decision-making, salary cap health in general is up across the league. Take a look at the cap numbers for each team heading into 2007 — only 4 squads have less than $5M to work with.
The cap has increased dramatically in the past 3 years. The 2007 salary cap figure is $109M, a moderate increase over last year’s number of $102M. In 2005, however, the cap was only $85.5M, before the CBA was extended at the 11th hour. Teams struggling to manage their cap numbers intelligently have certainly benefited from this rapidly-escalating ceiling (the Commanders, in particular, were bailed out by a big cap jump last offseason).
However, there are also a number of other factors that have contributed to the general increase of teams with healthy salary cap situations. Younger players are extended sooner, before they hit the open market (see: Andre Gurode, Bradie James). Older players with backloaded deals are asked to restructure before their contracts become a problem (see: Mark Brunell, Chad Pennington).
That is not to say that all cap management is a happy-go-lucky, friendship-oriented business, of course — teams are also structuring contracts in ways that make it easier to cut players without having to endure significant cap penalties. Look at the situations of Lawyer Milloy a few seasons back in New England, or the case of LaVar Arrington just last week with the New York Giants.
Terrell Owens‘ current contact with Dallas is a prime example of a deal which pays a player well but also makes it easy for a team to sever ties with him without putting themselves in cap prison. Deals like the Deion Sanders debacle in Washington, where teams are left paying players exorbitant salaries for years after they have been released, are becoming increasingly rare.
Dallas is an excellent example of a team that experienced some growing pains with the salary cap in its earlier incarnations, but in recent seasons has demonstrated a greatly-enhanced ability to work within its limitations while fielding a competitive roster. The latter part is important — teams like the Arizona Cardinals don’t get points for maintaining a healthy cap cushion in my book, because they have done so while remaining firmly in the basement of their divisions.
Below is a breakdown of Dallas’ total team salary going back to 1999, followed by the amount of flexibility that allowed them under the cap for that year. These numbers reflect Dallas’ situation entering the offseason, not at the start of the season — teams must be under the salary cap by March 2, or they face potential sanctions in the form of lost draft picks and fines:
1999: $50.1M ($3.0M)
2000: $54.1M ($0.9M)
2001: $48.5M ($-19.1M)
2002: $74.1M ($-3.0M)
2003: $81.0M ($-6.0M)
2004: $65.4M ($15.2M)
2005: $82.2M ($3.2M)
2006: $90.8M ($18.2M)
2007: $87.5M ($21.5M)
It is very difficult to find reliable cap numbers pre-1999 by team out there, or I would have gone back further. The 1997 and 1998 teams were also in rough cap shape as the organization tried to make one last run at a title with its aging stars (Aikman, Lett, Erik Williams, and others were still on the squad at that point).
What these numbers show is, though it has been a rocky road at times, the Cowboys have learned enough to put themselves in good cap shape for consecutive seasons for the first time in recent history, while also fielding a competitive team (again, that is a crucial component to consider).
Some of this is due to the youth of the current squad, but there is also much to compliment Jerry Jones, Stephen Jones, and Bill Parcells on in terms of decision-making: High-risk signings like Marcellus Wiley and Eddie George have been made only when there is low risk associated with the required investment, and free agency splashes have been made chiefly on players with reliable track records who are expected to be with the squad for the long term (Anthony Henry and Jason Ferguson vs. Adam Archuleta and Brandon Lloyd).
Just as a fun sidenote (it’s fun now, I suppose — I remember in 2001 it was not quite as humorous), here’s what a salary cap situation like the one shown for 2001 produces in terms of an offseason:
By Tim Wilson
For better or worse, the salary cap is here to stay in the NFL, and we are now firmly entrenched in what could probably be called the 2nd generation of the Salary Cap Era (or, “How I Learned to Love the Cap”
. Teams have figured out how to work within the constraints of the salary cap, and while there are still some occasional cases of poor decision-making, salary cap health in general is up across the league. Take a look at the cap numbers for each team heading into 2007 — only 4 squads have less than $5M to work with.The cap has increased dramatically in the past 3 years. The 2007 salary cap figure is $109M, a moderate increase over last year’s number of $102M. In 2005, however, the cap was only $85.5M, before the CBA was extended at the 11th hour. Teams struggling to manage their cap numbers intelligently have certainly benefited from this rapidly-escalating ceiling (the Commanders, in particular, were bailed out by a big cap jump last offseason).
However, there are also a number of other factors that have contributed to the general increase of teams with healthy salary cap situations. Younger players are extended sooner, before they hit the open market (see: Andre Gurode, Bradie James). Older players with backloaded deals are asked to restructure before their contracts become a problem (see: Mark Brunell, Chad Pennington).
That is not to say that all cap management is a happy-go-lucky, friendship-oriented business, of course — teams are also structuring contracts in ways that make it easier to cut players without having to endure significant cap penalties. Look at the situations of Lawyer Milloy a few seasons back in New England, or the case of LaVar Arrington just last week with the New York Giants.
Terrell Owens‘ current contact with Dallas is a prime example of a deal which pays a player well but also makes it easy for a team to sever ties with him without putting themselves in cap prison. Deals like the Deion Sanders debacle in Washington, where teams are left paying players exorbitant salaries for years after they have been released, are becoming increasingly rare.
Dallas is an excellent example of a team that experienced some growing pains with the salary cap in its earlier incarnations, but in recent seasons has demonstrated a greatly-enhanced ability to work within its limitations while fielding a competitive roster. The latter part is important — teams like the Arizona Cardinals don’t get points for maintaining a healthy cap cushion in my book, because they have done so while remaining firmly in the basement of their divisions.
Below is a breakdown of Dallas’ total team salary going back to 1999, followed by the amount of flexibility that allowed them under the cap for that year. These numbers reflect Dallas’ situation entering the offseason, not at the start of the season — teams must be under the salary cap by March 2, or they face potential sanctions in the form of lost draft picks and fines:
1999: $50.1M ($3.0M)
2000: $54.1M ($0.9M)
2001: $48.5M ($-19.1M)
2002: $74.1M ($-3.0M)
2003: $81.0M ($-6.0M)
2004: $65.4M ($15.2M)
2005: $82.2M ($3.2M)
2006: $90.8M ($18.2M)
2007: $87.5M ($21.5M)
It is very difficult to find reliable cap numbers pre-1999 by team out there, or I would have gone back further. The 1997 and 1998 teams were also in rough cap shape as the organization tried to make one last run at a title with its aging stars (Aikman, Lett, Erik Williams, and others were still on the squad at that point).
What these numbers show is, though it has been a rocky road at times, the Cowboys have learned enough to put themselves in good cap shape for consecutive seasons for the first time in recent history, while also fielding a competitive team (again, that is a crucial component to consider).
Some of this is due to the youth of the current squad, but there is also much to compliment Jerry Jones, Stephen Jones, and Bill Parcells on in terms of decision-making: High-risk signings like Marcellus Wiley and Eddie George have been made only when there is low risk associated with the required investment, and free agency splashes have been made chiefly on players with reliable track records who are expected to be with the squad for the long term (Anthony Henry and Jason Ferguson vs. Adam Archuleta and Brandon Lloyd).
Just as a fun sidenote (it’s fun now, I suppose — I remember in 2001 it was not quite as humorous), here’s what a salary cap situation like the one shown for 2001 produces in terms of an offseason:
COWBOYS’ OFFSEASON ADDITIONS: QB-Tony Banks (cut by BAL) signed with DAL (1 year/$500G); WR-Carl Pickens (cut by TEN) signed with DAL (1 year); RB-John Avery (XFL) signed with DAL (1 year); WR-Jermaine Copeland (XFL) signed with DAL (1 year).
Lest we forget what salary cap prison is like, that list should be posted on the wall of every capologist that Dallas employs.