AdamJT13;3964007 said:
I'm sure that they'd rather have it paid out "currently" than not at all, though. A cash minimum would force a team to spend a certain amount of money for a three-year period, regardless of how much it spent the year before that three-year period. Having only a cap minimum does not.
In a hypothetical example, let's say that the 2011 cap starts at $120 million and increases by $5 million per season. The 90 percent minimum would start at $108 million and increase by $4.5 million per season. So these would be the cap maximums and minimums through 2015, in millions --
2011 -- $120.0 max, $108.0 min
2012 -- $125.0 max, $112.5 min
2013 -- $130.0 max, $117.0 min
2014 -- $135.0 max, $121.5 min
2015 -- $140.0 max, $126.0 min
Now consider a hypothetical team that gives out one huge signing bonus in 2011, say $35 million for a five-year contract. To make it easy, we'll say that every other player on the team gets annual bonuses instead of prorated bonuses, and that the team's salaries and non-prorated bonuses total $101 million, $105.5 million, $110 million, $114.5 million and $119 million over these five years. With the $7 million annual proration included, the team would exactly meet the 90 percent cap minimum each season.
Let's look at the actual cash spent each season, though --
2011 -- $136 million (113.3 percent of cap)
2012 -- $105.5 million (84.4 percent)
2013 -- $110 million (84.6 percent)
2014 -- $114.5 million (84.8 percent)
2015 -- $119 million (85.0 percent)
For the period of 2012-14, the team actually spent only 84.6 percent of the cap in cash. That's $21 million less than it would be REQUIRED to spend if there was a cash minimum. It met the cap minimum, though, so with only a cap minimum, the team never has to spend that $21 million.
Even if the team spent right to the maximum in 2011 AND 2012 (adding $12 million in salaries for 2011 and $12.5 million in salaries for 2012), the team STILL would be required to spend another $21 million more in cash for 2013-2015 just to meet the cash minimum for that three-year period. Without it, the team would not have to spend that money. Ever.
This is a useful example, so let's keep working with it. The one issue I take with your argument is the claim that "with only a cap minimum, the team
never has to spend that $21 million", which it otherwise has to spend sometime in the years 2012-14. The reason that the team meets the cap minimum (but not the cash spend minimum) in 2012-14 in your example is because it has
already spent that $21 million. It spent it
upfront, as part of the $35 million signing bonus.
To see that, all we have to do is restructure your hypothetical contract, so that, instead of a $35 million signing bonus, the team pays a $7 million signing bonus upfront and roster bonuses (or, if you prefer, increases in the player's annual salary) of $7 million in each of the remaining four years of the contract. Now the issue you identify in the years 2012-2014 disappears and the cash spend distribution looks like this:
2011 -- $108 million (90.0 percent of cap)
2012 -- $112.5 million (90.0 percent)
2013 -- $117 million (90.0 percent)
2014 -- $121.5 million (90.0 percent)
2015 -- $126 million (90.0 percent)
The team, simply by redistributing the upfront signing bonus, has managed to bring itself into compliance with both a 90% cap minimum and a 90% cash spend minimum, without spending a single dollar more.
The problem, from the players' perpective, is that they would prefer the cash spend distribution you use in your example, viz.:
2011 -- $136 million (113.3 percent of cap)
2012 -- $105.5 million (84.4 percent)
2013 -- $110 million (84.6 percent)
2014 -- $114.5 million (84.8 percent)
2015 -- $119 million (85.0 percent)
As you know, there are two reasons they would prefer this distribution: (a) the upfront money is guaranteed, whereas additional salary or roster bonuses in later years may never be realized, if the player is cut, and (b) given the time value of money, $35 million in a player's pocket today is simply worth more, financially, than $7 million today and an additional $7 million in each of the next four years (using a conservative rate of return of 4%, it's worth over $3 million more).
Thus, by providing the owners with a disincentive to pay out big signing bonuses upfront, and an incentive to instead spread the payment of any proposed signing bonus over the term of the contract (either as salary or roster bonuses in subsequent years of the contract), players may be left worse off by a cash spend minimum instead of a cap minimum, even though the dollar amount of the contracts doesn't change.
The players could assume, of course, that owners will continue to pay out big signing bonuses (perhaps in order to give themselves a competitive advantage)
and later be forced to spend additional cash in order to remain in compliance with the cash spend minimum, but that's a dangerous assumption, given the economic incentives at play. And I think it's generally not advisable (certainly I would never advise a client) to assume, in a financial negotiation, that the other party will act contrary to its financial incentives in the future.