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After a spate of contract restructures get the Cowboys under the cap, its the contracts they chose not to restructure - and who they belong to - that tells us more about the team's intended direction.
On Tuesday, the Cowboys did some neat work to get under the NFL's $134 million salary cap by "flipping the switch’’ on clauses in three players' contracts. As expected, the team reworked Tony Romo’s deal, converting base salary into signing bonus that can be spread over the remainder of the contract, thus cutting his hefty $22-million cap figure roughly in half. In addition, the front office engineered similar restructures for Sean Lee and Orlando Scandrick (whose deals also had restructuring clauses - "switches" - built into them), which will give Dallas another $7 million worth of room.
None of this work should come as a big surprise; re-working these contracts was planned from the day the original deals were signed. As a result of these maneuvers, the team finds itself within a million dollars of the cap. With the rumored release of backup center Phil Costa, the Cowboys will erase another $1.5 million of cap commitment and, with fewer than a handful of moves, get under the cap in time for the advent of free agency. Should the team care to make it an even five, they can designate Miles Austin for a June 1 release, saving another $5.5 million in the process.
But, to my mind, that's not the real news. The real story here is who they didn't restructure. There are other Cowboys contracts that include this same sort of restructuring option. Two notable examples are Jason Witten and Brandon Carr, both of whom could have been given the same treatment had the team wanted or needed further cap relief. That the Cowboys didn't exercise either of these options is a telling instance of financial prudence, as are the recent stories coming from Valley Ranch that the team wants DeMarcus Ware to take a pay cut (insiders say Dallas wants something in the $6 to $8 million range).
Allow me a brief detour: in the first installment of my "front office report card" series, I wrote that its bad business to give big-money and/ or long-term contracts (typically "third" contracts) to veterans who are 30 or older, whether they be your own or another team's. When it comes to other team's veteran castoffs, the front office has operated fairly shrewdly; however, Jones' soft spot for productive (or only semi-productive) homegrown players, I wrote, has produced far too many contracts for older, declining Cowboy lifers whose production then failed to meet their pay grade by the end of the deal.
Along these lines (and related to this issue) is the team's recent policy of "kicking the can" via restructuring deals so that money on the present cap is deferred to future caps. While this has given the team immediate relief, it puts even more pressure on future caps. And the real problem lies in who they have tended to restructure: their "core" players, the majority of whom were brought in between 2003 and 2007. That means that now, in 2014, they are geriatric by NFL standards. Thus, the Cowboys "kick the can" fiscal policy has achieved roughly the same result as offering big contracts to old free agents with declining skills: it inevitably adds dead money to the rolls.
According to Spotrac, the Cowboys carried $17,297,848 in dead money in 2013. With an adjusted cap of roughly $119.2 million, that 2013 figure represents nearly a seventh of the total cap. And that's not an isolated incident; the team is currently holding $11,809,439 in dead money in 2014, and that's before they cut the likes of Miles Austin, DeMarcus Ware (if that happens) or any other FAs, draftees or UDFAs to whom they give guaranteed money. And, as long as the franchise continues to carry huge chunks of dead money on the rolls, they will continue to put themselves at a competitive disadvantage.
More... http://www.bloggingtheboys.com/2014...ation&utm_medium=mustreads&utm_campaign=blogs
On Tuesday, the Cowboys did some neat work to get under the NFL's $134 million salary cap by "flipping the switch’’ on clauses in three players' contracts. As expected, the team reworked Tony Romo’s deal, converting base salary into signing bonus that can be spread over the remainder of the contract, thus cutting his hefty $22-million cap figure roughly in half. In addition, the front office engineered similar restructures for Sean Lee and Orlando Scandrick (whose deals also had restructuring clauses - "switches" - built into them), which will give Dallas another $7 million worth of room.
None of this work should come as a big surprise; re-working these contracts was planned from the day the original deals were signed. As a result of these maneuvers, the team finds itself within a million dollars of the cap. With the rumored release of backup center Phil Costa, the Cowboys will erase another $1.5 million of cap commitment and, with fewer than a handful of moves, get under the cap in time for the advent of free agency. Should the team care to make it an even five, they can designate Miles Austin for a June 1 release, saving another $5.5 million in the process.
But, to my mind, that's not the real news. The real story here is who they didn't restructure. There are other Cowboys contracts that include this same sort of restructuring option. Two notable examples are Jason Witten and Brandon Carr, both of whom could have been given the same treatment had the team wanted or needed further cap relief. That the Cowboys didn't exercise either of these options is a telling instance of financial prudence, as are the recent stories coming from Valley Ranch that the team wants DeMarcus Ware to take a pay cut (insiders say Dallas wants something in the $6 to $8 million range).
Allow me a brief detour: in the first installment of my "front office report card" series, I wrote that its bad business to give big-money and/ or long-term contracts (typically "third" contracts) to veterans who are 30 or older, whether they be your own or another team's. When it comes to other team's veteran castoffs, the front office has operated fairly shrewdly; however, Jones' soft spot for productive (or only semi-productive) homegrown players, I wrote, has produced far too many contracts for older, declining Cowboy lifers whose production then failed to meet their pay grade by the end of the deal.
Along these lines (and related to this issue) is the team's recent policy of "kicking the can" via restructuring deals so that money on the present cap is deferred to future caps. While this has given the team immediate relief, it puts even more pressure on future caps. And the real problem lies in who they have tended to restructure: their "core" players, the majority of whom were brought in between 2003 and 2007. That means that now, in 2014, they are geriatric by NFL standards. Thus, the Cowboys "kick the can" fiscal policy has achieved roughly the same result as offering big contracts to old free agents with declining skills: it inevitably adds dead money to the rolls.
According to Spotrac, the Cowboys carried $17,297,848 in dead money in 2013. With an adjusted cap of roughly $119.2 million, that 2013 figure represents nearly a seventh of the total cap. And that's not an isolated incident; the team is currently holding $11,809,439 in dead money in 2014, and that's before they cut the likes of Miles Austin, DeMarcus Ware (if that happens) or any other FAs, draftees or UDFAs to whom they give guaranteed money. And, as long as the franchise continues to carry huge chunks of dead money on the rolls, they will continue to put themselves at a competitive disadvantage.
More... http://www.bloggingtheboys.com/2014...ation&utm_medium=mustreads&utm_campaign=blogs
