When they have so little margin for error it just becomes frustrating for them to play so well and then have these things beat them. Here is an excerpt from a Seattle article talking about their final drive, they finally switch to zone and can't make the tackle..:
• Third-and-six slant route to Graham for 8 yards: When teams play man-to-man with a single deep safety, they usually rush five defenders — or four, when using a shallow “lurk” safety near the line. Dallas rushed just three, which is very rare for man-to-man coverage. That left the Cowboys with essentially two lurk defenders, as linebacker Rolando McClain was “spying” Wilson to deter a quarterback scramble. Credit Seattle’s scheme, with Graham aligned to Wilson’s far left and Lockett inside of Graham. That created a legal pick and forced Church, the man covering Graham, to fight over the top of Lockett.
• Third-and-three arrow route to Lockett for 9 yards:When Byron Jones followed Doug Baldwin in motion, Wilson was assured that Dallas was in man-to-man coverage. The Cowboys gambled with this type of man coverage: press coverage, with both cornerbacks to Wilson’s left jamming Jermaine Kearse (the widest receiver) and Lockett (the slot receiver inside) at the line of scrimmage. Such a technique disrupts the timing and minimizes the separation of the quick passing game, but, when both defenders are at the line, the coverage is susceptible to picks and rubs. Again, credit the play call. Anticipating man coverage, Kearse now picked for Lockett on Lockett’s arrow route to the flat.
• Switch comeback to Baldwin for 15 yards: From the Cowboys’ 46 with Seattle anticipating man coverage, the Seahawks employed a pick play of a different sort: a “switch” release, which resembled a switch on a train track. Baldwin, from his slot alignment, crisscrosses with Lockett. The effect against man coverage is similar to the picks employed at the line of scrimmage, except the switch release — made popular by the old run-and-shoot offense — creates the pick about 15 yards downfield. The ample separation by Baldwin was the result.
• Zone-read keep for 8 yards: At the Dallas 28, the Cowboys’ adjustment to motion again indicated man coverage (the zone in zone-read refers to the offensive-line blocking scheme, not the coverage of the defense). Though this was a designed run all the way, the Cowboys’ man coverage was key. When Demarcus Lawrence, the defensive end to Wilson’s right, collapsed inside, that gave Wilson a read to keep the ball in the alley, just outside right tackle. With Baldwin aligned in the adjacent slot, Jones was aligned over Baldwin in a position to deter a Wilson keep. Against zone coverage, Baldwin might not have had the leverage to block Jones if Jones was aligned slightly inside of him. Against this man coverage, however, Jones followed Baldwin out of Wilson’s running lane on an out-breaking bubble route.
• Third-and-seven scramble for 10 yards: With 3:01 remaining from the Dallas 17, the clock now was the principle factor and a field-goal attempt was nearly a foregone conclusion. If Dallas stopped Seattle on this play, the Cowboys’ offense would have at least 2:45 after the ensuing kickoff to drive for a potential game-winning field goal. The Cowboys now abandoned the man coverage they had played predominantly on the drive and played a three-deep zone. The Seahawks’ primary receiver was Graham on an outbreaking corner route, but from this formation it was difficult for Graham to gain outside leverage against a cover-three defense. Dallas again rushed just three, with McClain spying Wilson, but the quarterback’s elusiveness rendered that tactic useless and McClain was left in Wilson’s roostertail. Evading a slow linebacker was expected, but defensive backs Church and Jones took bad angles, underestimating Wilson’s speed as Wilson again showed why he’s the NFL’s most dangerous quarterback while on the move.
Full link:
http://www.seattletimes.com/sports/...ttles-final-drive-against-the-dallas-cowboys/
