People ignore context. Why, I don't know.....People hate data. Why, I don't know.
It sure feels like Garrett punts a ton from the opposition's side of the field, and Sunday night was certainly no exception. We punted four times from Giants territory out of nine total drives. Those fourth downs:
The last drive is definitely a punting situation. I'm not sure what the numbers say about the 4th and 7, but I'd go for that with our offense. The first two should be automatic go for it situations unless there is a compelling game situation, which there was not at those points.
- 4th and 3 from the Giants 43
- 4th and 2 from the Giants 44
- 4th and 7 from the Giants 42
- 4th and 20 from the Giants 42
When it is a low scoring game - field position is key to who wins so in this game and with the way our D was playing, you have to punt!
Given the Giants offense, all of these situations were punts. This isn't Madden, field position matters in close games
Dallas was 8-15 on third downs.
Teams should take Shanahan's approach. This is a perfect example of the issue facing coaches. The 49ers were playing a much better team (as they will be doing all season long). If he sits back and punts, punts, punts, they lose: maybe not by 20 points, but they lose. When you're facing a much stronger opponent, you should be adopting high-risk high-reward strategies. Those strategies increase your odds of winning, and they increase your odds of getting blown out. They decrease your odds of losing by a "respectable" margin, the kind that lets the coach avoid criticism but doesn't win games.Maybe he should have taken Kyle Shannahan's (sp) approach..........oh wait.
Data hardly qualifies as data? That's an interesting perspective. How about this?
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/05/upshot/4th-down-when-to-go-for-it-and-why.html
Data hardly qualifies as data? That's an interesting perspective. How about this?
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/05/upshot/4th-down-when-to-go-for-it-and-why.html
I expect that the vast majority of that data is from 3rd downs, not 4th downs (that's how this is typically done). And to the extent that there is 4th down data, much of it occurs when teams have to go for it (it's late and they're behind), not when they're choosing to go for it. And those situations would tend to skew the other way (if it's late and you're behind, that's usually because the other team is better than you, so the probability of making it is lower than average).There are problems with that type of data.
Simple example:
The data is based on historical success/fail rates of going for it. The problem is that coaches go for it when they think they have a very high probability of making it; therefore, the data is heavily skewed to towards success.
Yes there are times you do it and time you punt. It makes no sense vs a top defense to allow them the chance to change momentum and get the ball back in great field position.
Teams should take Shanahan's approach. This is a perfect example of the issue facing coaches. The 49ers were playing a much better team (as they will be doing all season long). If he sits back and punts, punts, punts, they lose: maybe not by 20 points, but they lose. When you're facing a much stronger opponent, you should be adopting high-risk high-reward strategies. Those strategies increase your odds of winning, and they increase your odds of getting blown out. They decrease your odds of losing by a "respectable" margin, the kind that lets the coach avoid criticism but doesn't win games.
Conversely, if you're playing a much weaker team, you should adopt low-risk strategies and just beat them with talent. Variance is your enemy in these games.
If you're playing a better team you don't help them by giving them the ball, period. You need to pursue every chance of scoring to the maximum extent possible.No they shouldn't, his approach allowed the Panthers a short field, and each time he lost on fourth down he put his defense right back out on the field preventing them from getting into any kind of rhythm. If you playing a better team you don't help them by giving them a short field.