It sure feels like Garrett punts a ton from the opposition's side of the field, and Sunday night was certainly no exception. We punted four times from Giants territory out of nine total drives. Those fourth downs:
The last drive is definitely a punting situation. I'm not sure what the numbers say about the 4th and 7, but I'd go for that with our offense. The first two should be automatic go for it situations unless there is a compelling game situation, which there was not at those points.
- 4th and 3 from the Giants 43
- 4th and 2 from the Giants 44
- 4th and 7 from the Giants 42
- 4th and 20 from the Giants 42
Not at all. The third down data isn't skewed and constitutes the vast majority of the data set. And imperfect data isn't "worthless". Imperfect data is better than no data, as long as it is carefully evaluated and applied.Yes, the point is that it's easy to conceive of multiple ways in which the data is skewed. Once you know the data is skewed relative to what would actually happen, then the data becomes worthless because you can't quantify the skew.
Seems almost too simple an explanation. Sigh.I think pinning the Giants down around their own 10 was the right thing to do. Why risk giving up great starting field position to the Giants? If we are trailing I would be more inclined to take the risk
That's exactly right. Coaches have concluded that improving their chances of winning is not worth the risk of making fans (and press, and ownership) livid.I don't think so nor do most coaches because the vast majority of the time they play for the field position. To pin the opponent by their own endzone. Had Dallas gone for it and not made it I can promise people here would be livid. It was not worth the risk.
As I said earlier, his strategy increased the odds of winning and the odds of getting blown out, while decreasing the odds of losing by a "respectable" score. The 49ers scored 3 points in the game, so "each team will get opportunities to be on offense" isn't very compelling. They scored those 3 points on a drive where they converted a 4th-down attempt. If they never tried, maybe they lose 10-0 or 13-0 instead of 23-3. Why is that better? If they'd converted a couple more of the 4th down attempts, they might actually have been in a position to win. Punting certainly wasn't going to help them score more points.No, you need to put them in disadvantaged positions, such as pinning them back, not mid field. Each team will get opportunities to be on offense, the longer they have travel to score the better your defense will have the opportunity to succeed. Kyle's strategy contributed to his team being blown out.
On of the biggest reason the Giants only scored 3 points was because the Giants had to go 90 yards most of the time. And they didn't have the offensive game to do it.
If you think you are going to be in a shootout, the coach needs to be more aggressive. In this case, playing the field position game was the way to go.
Analytics isn't the answer to everything. Game situations and strategy matters.
Absolutely.Proper use of analytics includes opponents data and game situations. I do agree with you given the Giants offense/no OBJ it probably made sense to punt there.
Against GB, e.g.. very different...probably go for it 2 of those 4 times, maybe 3.
and how many did we score during the 3rd qtr without the balland got the 3. It is just harder for any offense to drive mistake free on 90 yard drives. NY needed their defense to give them a chance and Dallas was smart enough not to give them an opportunity to change the course of the game.
As I said earlier, his strategy increased the odds of winning and the odds of getting blown out, while decreasing the odds of losing by a "respectable" score. The 49ers scored 3 points in the game, so "each team will get opportunities to be on offense" isn't very compelling. They scored those 3 points on a drive where they converted a 4th-down attempt. If they never tried, maybe they lose 10-0 or 13-0 instead of 23-3. Why is that better? If they'd converted a couple more of the 4th down attempts, they might actually have been in a position to win. Punting certainly wasn't going to help them score more points.
You can't take credit for pinning them at the 6 and also for the chance of a penalty. You need to look at the expected field position gained by the punt.Who has the data for the scoring percentages from the 43 yard line versus the 6 yard line and the 44 yd line versus the 9 yard line, which is what actually happened? Plus the percentage of returns that incur a receiving penalty to push them back half the distance? How does it change the momentum of the Game?
- 4th and 3 from the Giants 43
- 4th and 2 from the Giants 44
Every Ivy league statistician will tell you that you should almost never ever punt when you're on the opponent's side of midfield.
NFL coaches are too scared to do the right thing. That's one reason Belichek is so successful. He know he won't get fired so he does whatever the F he wants.
and they are only livid when it goes wrongThat's exactly right. Coaches have concluded that improving their chances of winning is not worth the risk of making fans (and press, and ownership) livid.
We know that if they'd punted, they wouldn't have scored any points on those drives. I'll say it again: the 49ers didn't score AT ALL except when they went for it on 4th down. If you don't score, you can't possibly win. You're arguing that they should have tried less hard to score in a game where they didn't score at all. No. You play to win the game. And to win you must score.They lost "respectable", but they still lost, last I check "You play to win the game" .We don't know what would have happen if they punted because they chose to go for it and give the Panthers a short field. We can go back and forth but at the end of the day, the were BLOWN out, Primary because taking those sort of risks will get you beat. Kyle even mention himself that he regretted taking all those chances.
Situation is everything. When you are going against an offense that is struggling to get out of it's own way, the field position battle is paramount. Sometimes, all it takes, is a gift of a starting position to get an offense going and the momentum moving in their favor. Jason absolutely made the right decision against the Giants. As for other instances, I'd have to know more about the circumstances in-game to weigh in on it.It sure feels like Garrett punts a ton from the opposition's side of the field, and Sunday night was certainly no exception. We punted four times from Giants territory out of nine total drives. Those fourth downs:
The last drive is definitely a punting situation. I'm not sure what the numbers say about the 4th and 7, but I'd go for that with our offense. The first two should be automatic go for it situations unless there is a compelling game situation, which there was not at those points.
- 4th and 3 from the Giants 43
- 4th and 2 from the Giants 44
- 4th and 7 from the Giants 42
- 4th and 20 from the Giants 42
We know that if they'd punted, they wouldn't have scored any points on those drives. I'll say it again: the 49ers didn't score AT ALL except when they went for it on 4th down. If you don't score, you can't possibly win. You're arguing that they should have tried less hard to score in a game where they didn't score at all. No. You play to win the game. And to win you must score.
You can't take credit for pinning them at the 6 and also for the chance of a penalty. You need to look at the expected field position gained by the punt.
4th and 3 from the opponents' 43. Success rate for that distance and that position on the field is around 55%. (It gets lower down near the opponents' end zone, because they have less field to defend).
If you go for it and succeed, your expected points scored is at least 2.66. (It may be better because you may gain more than 3 yards on the 4th down play).
If you go for it and fail, your expected points scored is -1.63. (Your opponent has the ball near midfield).
If you punt, you expect them to get the ball somewhere around the 12-14 yard line. From there, your expected points scored is right around 0. (It goes positive closer to the end zone, because of safeties and because you're likely to have good field position on your NEXT drive).
Based on this, going for it gives you 0.73 expected points scored, and punting gives you 0 expected points scored. The choice is clear.
Okay, but the Giants have a very good defense, so maybe your chances aren't 55% (although I'll remind you that we were 53% on 3rd-down conversions in this game, and several of those were much longer than 3 yards). Well, it turns out the breakeven point for this decision is at a 36% success rate, and you can't convince me that we didn't have a better than 36% chance of converting that down.
Okay, but we have a super-duper kicker who we know can pin them at the 6. Now the breakeven is 39%. I'm still going for it.
Okay, but the Giants have a really bad offense, so pinning them is even better for us. Well, yeah, but giving them the ball at their 43 is also not as bad for us, so that washes out somewhat. It's certainly not a big enough effect to change this decision, which really isn't close.
What are you talking about? Failing on fourth down gives the opponent the ball, but so does punting. They didn't give the Panthers more opportunities. In fact, you could argue that they got more offensive drives than they would have if they'd punted, since the Panthers weren't running as much time off the clock on their own drives as they might have. The 49ers didn't score because they failed on their 4th down conversions, not because they attempted 4th down conversions. The strategy was correct: it just didn't work out this time. The punting strategy was an even more certain loser. And always remember, the 49ers stink. Most strategies are going to result in them losing. They should still pursue the strategies that give them the best possible chance of winning, though.They only scored 3 points because they gave the Panthers more opportunities with the ball because they kept failing in forth down. This isn't Madden, you punt the ball and put Panthers in a MORE difficult position to score, not an EASIER position to score, so out of say 4 attempts they get 1 and score 3 points. Strategy like gets you fired, which is why it's not done. You have defensive players for a reason. And like I said Kyle himself regretted taking that many chances.
That's factored in there: the opponents have a much better chance to score when they get the ball at the 43 than pinned deep (hence the -1.63 expected points associated with going for it and failing). There's no question that (go for it and fail) is worse than (punt). But (got for it and succeed) is so very much better than either of the other two cases that it makes it worth trying.Yeah, I get all that but I was talking about the Giants chances of scoring from the 6 and the 9 which is where we pinned them.. Good post, but then you have to start inter tangling the pros and cons of each scenario. It's not just 4th down percentage, you have to also weigh in the negative data if you don't convert.
There are lots of factors that play into it. But NFL teams have ready access to the data and brainpower to do a really good job on that analysis. It's a shame that they don't.I agree that more often than not that going for it on 4th down is a good move but there are a lot of other factors that play into it. We played Parcell's Ball Sunday which is really boring but he took several teams to the Superbowl and a Quincy Carter led team to the playoffs playing field position.