You're not explaining anything. Your'e making assertions without any support or evidence. The things you're asserting are simply wrong, and there's a ton of data out there to support that.
It's interesting. I watched this process happen 20 years ago in baseball. New stats and analytics were coming along and it became obvious to those looking at the data that teams were making poor strategic decisions about things like stolen bases and hit-and-run plays (not to mention player evaluation). There was massive resistance from fans and the press and the teams themselves to incorporating these ideas. And now, finally, years later, they've completely taken over the game. And now the teams are leading the way on data-driven innovation, with all the shifting being the most obvious example. Football is way ahead in some areas, but in others, like 4th down calls, it's the same pattern. I'll be very surprised if, 10 years from now, 4th down decision-making hasn't drastically changed.
Data? What kind of data are you referring to? Were you hoping I would provide data compiled by a completely different team, in completely different weather conditions, under completely different circumstances, against completely different opposition, with completely different levels of talent? I'm not sure how that data would help.
But I can tell you this. The easiest way to look at this debate is to simply follow the money. The majority of the Cowboys cap is devoted to their offense; that, I believe, is common knowledge. So it is reasonable to expect that the Cowboys have much more confidence in their offense than they do their defense. So, to answer the question in the op once again, the reason you punt the ball when it is just shy of field goal range and yet still in the oppositions side of the field is simple: the Cowboys trust in their offenses ability to get there again.
This team's strategy (more common knowledge) is to protect their otherwise suspect defense, which is why they place a premium on holding the ball and keeping the oppositions offense off the field. The more long fields we give the opposing offense the more plays they have to perform to score, the more chance for them to make a mistake. If you go for it and you miss, the opposition then only has to drive 15 to 20 yards to be in field goal range. The last thing the Cowboys wanted last Sunday night was to start trading field goals with the Giants. So, smartly, they continued to place the Giants beyond their own 20 to make them attempt to drive 50 yards to get into field goal range, which they were able to shut down all but once.
Lastly, this strategy of punting assisted the Cowboys in clock management. The more field the Giants had to drive, the more time they exhausted off of the clock. Had the Cowboys given them a short field, that affords the Giants a better opportunity for a quick score.
In essence, if the Cowboys were a team that invested more in their defense than their offense and as a result had a dominant defense, they might take more chances like that for the simple fact that they don't know when their offense will have field position like that again and they trust their defense to get the stop. The Cowboys, however, have the luxury of knowing that regardless of where their offense starts they can drive up the field and score, regardless of the strength of the oppositions defense.
Make sense?
When is field position ever more important than points?
Would you take a knee on fourth-and-1 from the opponent's 9-yard line to guarantee they start at their own 10? Of course not -- because points are far more important than field position.
That question has absolutely nothing to do with the conversation.
Given the scenario that the Cowboys are outside of field goal range, but are in the oppositions territory, in most cases, the smart move for the Cowboys in particular is to punt. See response above for the reasons why that rule particularly applies to the Cowboys. Were we talking about the Giants, I'd say they need to go for it alot because their offense doesn't have the talent (as evidenced by Sunday night) to move the ball up the field like the Cowboys can. The Cowboys had no reason to press Sunday night. They held the lead, they had the momentum, and so all they really had to do (like Mayweather did to McGregor) is allow the Giants to exhaust themselves attempting to drive up the field in small manageable bites; for the most part the Cowboys took away the intermediate to deep routes to force the underneath pass then they made sure the runner's did not have anywhere to go beyond the catching point. The Cowboys also effectively shut down the Giants run game. So the only option left to the Giants offense was to play perfect football all the way up the field, which they proved on all but one drive they were not up to the task. That's smart coaching on the Cowboys part.
Had the Cowboys gone for it and failed to convert, the Giants would then only have to drive 15 to 20 yards to be in field goal range. The Cowboys rightfully placed more faith in their offenses ability to drive up the field than their defenses ability to prevent the Giants offense from getting 15 yards. It really is that simple.
