Insomniac
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I don't think anyone is debating the fact that the above is the existing policy. And the language provided doesn't speak to the point Childs Play was attempting to make. My point is, if you have been absolved from any wrongdoing legally (i.e. charges dropped, no conviction, no arrest, et cetera), then what can the league or any employer justify as "detrimental conduct" when it's been determined you weren't involved in said action.
If the response is "well, they don't need a basis to do suspend a player" then it goes back to my original comment from earlier in the thread about someone needs to take the league to task. Can anyone who has worked in the private sector provide an example of someone being suspended without pay and without any basis to point to?
When Rothlisberger was accused of rape he ended up getting a 4 game suspension even though he was never charged.
I agree that the Commissioner's power shouldn't be so absolute but the law is on the NFL's side.
The language in the CBA gives the Commissioner the authority to determine what constitutes "conduct detrimental to the league" and what the penalty should be. The decision by Judge Barrington Parker in the Brady case states that even if the Commissioner makes mistakes of fact or law he has the power to impose discipline.
http://www.gannett-cdn.com/experiments/usatoday/Sports/2016-04-25-tom-brady-suspension-appeal.pdf
The basic principle driving both our analysis and our
conclusion is well established: a federal court’s review of labor
arbitration awards is narrowly circumscribed and highly
deferential—indeed, among the most deferential in the law. ...
Our obligation is limited to determining
whether the arbitration proceedings and award met the minimum
legal standards established by the Labor Management Relations Act,
29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. (the “LMRA”). We must simply ensure that
the arbitrator was “even arguably construing or applying the
contract and acting within the scope of his authority” and did not
“ignore the plain language of the contract.” United Paperworks Int’l
Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987). These standards do not
require perfection in arbitration awards. Rather, they dictate that
even if an arbitrator makes mistakes of fact or law, we may not
disturb an award so long as he acted within the bounds of his
bargained‐for authority.
Here, that authority was especially broad. The Commissioner
was authorized to impose discipline for, among other things,
“conduct detrimental to the integrity of, or public confidence, in the
game of professional football.” In their collective bargaining
agreement, the players and the League mutually decided many
years ago that the Commissioner should investigate possible rule
violations, should impose appropriate sanctions, and may preside at
arbitrations challenging his discipline. Although this tripartite
regime may appear somewhat unorthodox, it is the regime
bargained for and agreed upon by the parties, which we can only
presume they determined was mutually satisfactory.